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Capitalism	 leads	 to	 dole	 queues,	 the	 scramble	 for	 markets,	 and	 war.	
Collectivism	 leads	 to	 concentration	 camps,	 leader	 worship,	 and	 war.	
There	 is	no	way	out	of	 this	unless	a	planned	economy	can	somehow	be	
combined	with	the	freedom	of	the	intellect,	which	can	only	happen	if	the	





our	 knowledge.	 It	 is	 an	 insight	 economists	might	 reach	 if	 they	were	 to	
apply	 postmodern	 notions	 of	 indeterminacy,	 open-endedness,	










inevitability	 of	 socialism	 and	 central	 planning	which	 had	 become	 the	 common	
sense	 of	 the	 time	 (Hayek	 1944).	 Subsequently,	 his	 ideas	 have	 become	 the	
bedrock	 for	 neoliberalism	 and	 its	 dominance	 of	 the	 global	 economic	 policy	
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agenda.1	Whatever	 the	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 arguments	 of	 Hayek	 and	 others	
from	 the	 Mont	 Pelegrin	 Society,	 or	 as	 Mirowski	 aptly	 names	 them,	 the	
‘Neoclassical	 Thought	 Collective’	 (Mirowski	 2013),	 they	 have	 become	 the	
common	sense	of	our	times.	
	
Hayek’s	 central	 thesis	 of	 the	 links	 between	markets	 and	private	 ownership	 on	
the	 one	 hand,	 and	 liberty	 and	 democracy	 on	 the	 other,	 has	 been	 absorbed	
faithfully	by	the	mainstream	political	classes	in	North	America	and	Europe	in	the	
period	since	1980.	It	is	predicated	upon	a	set	of	arguments	between	knowledge	
and	 economic	 decision-making	 that	 are	 an	 important	 challenge	 to	 traditional	
versions	 of	 socialism.	 Despite	 the	 overwhelming	 evidence	 of	 the	 deepening	
inequities	 between	 economic	 elites	 and	 the	 broader	 mass	 of	 the	 population,	
neoliberal	 ideas	 have	 survived	 the	 recent	 economic	 crisis	 remarkably	 intact	
(Crouch	 2011,	 Mirowski	 2013),	 largely	 because	 they	 continue	 to	 serve	 the	
interests	of	political	and	economic	elites.	There	is	a	growing	disconnect	between	
economic	 realities	 and	 mainstream	 discourses	 bringing	 home	 Gramsci’s	
important	point	about	the	deepening	relationship	between	civil	society	and	the	
state	in	the	exercise	of	hegemonic	power	as	capitalism	becomes	more	advanced	
and	 complex	 (Gramsci	1971).	Elites	 are	often	 able	 to	 strengthen	 their	position	
during	 economic	 crises,	 rather	 than	 there	 being	 an	 opening	 up	 to	 challenges	
from	below,	because	of	 their	 continuing	grip	on	 the	 institutions	of	 civil	 society	





to	 continue	 to	 highlight	 the	 nefarious	 impact	 of	 unfettered	 and	 deregulated	
markets,	as	indeed	Orwell	did	long	ago	in	his	review	of	Hayek’s	work.	We	must	
also	 engage	 more	 critically	 with	 Hayekian	 critiques	 of	 older	 versions	 of	
socialism,	 which	 still	 hold	 massive	 sway	 over	 critical	 policy	 discourses.	 In	
particular,	I	argue	in	this	chapter	that	if	we	are	to	move	along	a	path	to	a	more	
radical	and	egalitarian	political	economy,	we	need	to	address	these	criticisms	as	




starting	 point	 in	 engaging	 with	 Hayek	 from	 the	 left	 but	 does	 not	 exhaust	 the	
possibilities	 for	 reconnecting	 democracy,	 freedom	 and	 pluralism	 in	 a	 socialist	
economic	 project.	 Engaging	 critically	 but	 sympathetically	 here	 with	 Burczak’s	
work,	 I	 also	 draw	 upon	 further	 critiques	 of	 Hayek	 by	 O’Neill	 and	 Neurath	 to	
prepare	 the	 ground	 for	 rethinking	 the	 relations	between	economic	democracy,	
markets	and	planning.	As	part	of	this	project	I	close	with	some	suggestions	about	
some	 basic	 principles	 for	 forms	 of	 public	 ownership2	that	 would	 stimulate	
participation,	pluralism	and	deliberation	in	economic	decision-making.	
	
Hayekian	 inspired	 critiques	 of	 socialism	 and	 public	 ownership	 as	 state	
centralised	planning	
Hayek’s	 argument	 against	 socialism,	 associated	 in	 his	 eyes	 with	 planning	 and	
collective	 or	 public	 ownership	 as	 evidenced	 in	 his	 most	 influential	 book,	 The	
Road	to	Serfdom	(1944),	 is	that	it	 leads	to	the	centralisation	of	economic	power	
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and	 decision-making,	 and	 the	 crushing	 of	 individual	 freedoms	 and	 democracy.	
Hayek	 believed	 that	 once	 attempts	 were	 made	 to	 consciously	 plan	 and	






By	 concentrating	power	 so	 that	 it	 can	be	used	 in	 the	 service	of	 a	 single	
plan,	it	is	not	merely	transferred	but	infinitely	heightened;	that	by	uniting	
in	the	hands	of	some	single	body	power	formerly	exercised	independently	
by	many,	an	amount	of	power	 is	created	 infinitely	greater	 than	any	 that	
existed	 before……	 There	 is	 in	 a	 competitive	 society	 nobody	 who	 can	
exercise	 even	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	 power	 which	 a	 socialist	 planning	 board	
would	possess.	(1944,	149)	
	
The	 implications	 for	 Hayek	 are	 that	 private	 ownership	 and	 competitive	






The	 historical	 record	 of	 actually	 existing	 state	 socialisms	 in	 the	 twentieth	
century,	from	China	to	Cuba,	to	the	former	Soviet	Union,	does	much	to	bear	out	
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Hayek’s	warnings	with	 regard	 to	 the	 relations	 between	 central	 planning,	 state	
ownership	and	democracy.	The	growth	of	the	state	in	market	economies	under	
more	 social	 democratic	 auspices	 in	 Britain,	 France	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 post	
1945	era	also	tended	towards	more	centralised	forms	of	public	ownership	with	
little	 progress	made	 in	 devolving	 economic	 decision-making	power	 away	 from	
elites	 towards	workers	and	citizens.3	Furthermore,	Hayek	argued	that	planning	









If	 we	 can	 agree	 that	 the	 economic	 problem	 of	 society	 is	 mainly	 one	 of	
rapid	adaptation	 to	 changes	 in	 the	particular	 circumstances	of	 time	and	
place	 it	would	seem	to	 follow	that	the	ultimate	decisions	must	be	 left	 to	
the	people	who	are	familiar	with	these	circumstances,	who	know	directly	
of	 the	 relevant	 changes	 and	 of	 the	 resources	 immediately	 available	 to	
meet	them.	(Hayek	1948:	26)	
While	 Hayek	 did	 not	 dispute	 that	 planning	 was	 important	 to	 some	 areas	 of	
economic	life,	notably	the	“public	utilities”	(Hayek	1944,	51),	the	complexities	of	
the	 modern	 economy	 in	 most	 other	 areas	 meant	 that	 planning	 would	 be	
hopelessly	ineffective	compared	to	the	market:	
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a	 centralised	 plan.	 For	 Hayek,	 once	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 uncertainty	 and	 knowledge	
problems	 required	 decentralised	 decision	 making	 in	 constantly	 changing	
conditions	 of	 supply	 and	 demand,	 the	 price	 mechanism	 becomes	 the	 only	
instrument	that	can	deliver	effective	solutions.	It	is	precisely	the	anarchy	of	the	
market	 order	 that	 gives	 it	 its	 strength	 in	 these	 terms	 in	 promoting	 both	
democratic	 decision-making	 and	 innovation. Dispersed	 decision-making,	















market	 forces	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 growing	 concentration	 of	 decision-making	
power,	rather	than	its	decentralization,	and	the	alienation	of	most	people	on	the	
planet	(arguably	consumers	as	much	as	producers)	from	the	key	decisions	that	
affect	 their	 lives.	 Globally,	 economic	 policies	 inspired	 by	 Hayek’s	 vision	 are	
leading	 to	 an	 accumulation	 of	 wealth	 in	 fewer	 hands	 in	 which	 the	 private	
appropriation	 of	 public	 assets	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role.	 The	 heightened	
financialisation	and	commodification	of	everyday	economic	 life	 can	also	hardly	
be	described	as	contributing	to	the	more	open-ended	and	decentralized	forms	of	
knowledge	 production	 that	 Hayek	 argued	 would	 flow	 from	 market	 relations.	
Indeed,	 as	 Mirowski	 has	 wonderfully	 captured	 in	 his	 recent	 tome,	 neoliberal	
capitalism	 seems	 to	 thrive	 on	 promoting	 ignorance	 and	 muddle	 among	 the	
general	 populace	 about	 how	 the	 economy	 actually	 functions	 (Mirowski	 2013).	
Certainly,	today’s	corporate	and	financialised	global	economy	is	a	long	way	from	




the	 importance	 of	 decentralized	decision	making	 and	 the	 potential	 inherent	 in	





No	 convincing	 scheme	 for	 durable	 economic	 decentralisation	 has	 been	
proposed,	without	the	equivalent	decentralisation	of	the	powers	to	make	
contracts,	set	prices,	and	exchange	products	and	property	rights,	through	
markets	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 property	 exchange.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	
markets	are	regarded	as	optimal	or	 ideal,	nor	 that	an	entire	economy	 is	
made	subject	to	‘market	forces’.	It	does	mean,	however,	that	markets	and	
exchange	 are	 necessary	 to	 sustain	 genuine	 economic	 pluralism	 and	
diversity.	(Hodgson	1999:	31)	
	
The	 underlying	 point	 here	 is	 inescapable.	 A	 system	 of	 completely	 centralized	
planning	contains	serious	flaws,	in	terms	of	economic	efficiency,	social	need	and	
democratic	 accountability.	 Economists	who	 have	 been	 sympathetic	 to	 socialist	
ideals	have	 long	recognized	 the	 limits	 to	central	 coordination	and	 the	need	 for	
‘decentred’	and	more	spontaneous	mechanisms	for	day-to-day	decisions.	This	is	
because	 the	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 that	 lead	 to	 new	 innovations	 in	 products,	
services	and	processes	do	not	arise	 in	 the	main	 from	 formal	planned	research,	
administered	 by	 committees	 (whether	 of	 multinational	 companies	 or	 state	
bureaucracies),	but	take	place	through	social	interaction	in	the	coming	together	
of	individuals	in	a	free,	open	and	democratic	exchange	of	ideas.	Taking	seriously	
the	 dynamic	 and	 evolutionary	 nature	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 its	 implications,	 in	
terms	of	tacit	institutions,	rules,	habits,	customs	and	the	deeply	rooted	practices	
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processes	 in	 addressing	 socio-economic	 problems.	 Indeed	 the	 argument	 here,	
and	returned	 to	 later,	 is	 somewhat	different	 (see	also	Cumbers	2012,	Cumbers	
and	McMaster	2012).	The	 failure	 to	 treat	knowledge	production	and	economic	
action	 as	 socially	 embedded	 and	 interactive	 is	 a	 criticism	 that	 can	 be	 leveled	









with	Hayek’s	was	 to	 advocate	 various	 versions	of	market	 socialism	 (e.g.	 Lange	
and	 Taylor	 1938;	 Hodgson	 1984;	 Nove	 1983)	 where	 market	 discovery	
mechanisms	are	combined	with	more	collective	forms	of	ownership.	Perhaps	the	
most	 sophisticated	 and	 compelling	 variant	 to	 date	 is	 Theodore	 Burczak’s	
proposal	of	a	competitive	market	economy	consisting	of	employee-owned	firms	
(Burczak	 2006).	 Given	 the	 limited	 space	 available	 I	 will	 greatly	 simplify	
Burczak’s	 arguments	 greatly	 here,	 but	 essentially	 he	 brings	 together	 a	Marxist	
sensibility	around	issues	of	labour	appropriation	with	a	Hayekian	perspective	on	
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markets	 as	 discovery	 processes.	 Therein,	 he	 is	 able	 to	 recapture	 liberty	 and	
democracy	 from	 its	 appropriation	 by	 the	 right	 in	 a	 revised	 project	 for	 social	
justice	and	emancipation.	
	
Following	 De	 Martino	 (2000,	 2003),	 Burczak	 is	 concerned	 that	 a	 project	 for	
social	 justice	 concerns	 itself	 with	 “appropriative	 justice”	 in	 addition	 to	
“distributive	 justice”.	 Distributive	 justice	 can	 be	 dealt	 with	 through	 proposals	
such	as	minimum	income	guarantees	and	wealth	taxes	that	provide	individuals	
with	 the	 resources	 that	 allow	 them	 to	make	 ‘choiceworthy’	 decisions	 (Burczak	
2006:	95).	But	what	is	compelling	for	out	argument	here	is	his	response	to	Hayek	
in	addressing	appropriative	justice.	For	him,	the	source	of	a	Marxist	concern	with	
exploitation	 and	 alienation	 under	 capitalist	 social	 relations	 is	 the	 employment	
relations	 rather	 than	 private	 property.	 In	 this	 framing,	 exploitation	 occurs	 not	
because	 we	 have	 a	 market	 society	 per	 se	 but	 because	 we	 have	 forms	 of	
ownership	 that	 can	 be	 privately	 appropriated	 by	 a	 few	 –	 the	 one	 per	 cent	 in	
today’s	parlance	–	at	 the	expense	of	 the	majority	–	 the	99	per	cent.	A	minority	
therefore	appropriates	undemocratically	the	labour	of	the	vast	majority	of	direct	
producers.	Drawing	upon	Sen,	Nussbaum	and	others,	 and	 in	 a	direct	 attack	on	
negative	 conceptions	 of	 liberty	 advanced	 by	 Hayek,	 Rawls	 and	 others	 before	
them,	 most	 notably	 Locke,	 Burczak	 rightly	 recognizes	 this	 exploitation	 as	 an	
assault	 on	 human	 dignity.	 As	 he	 puts	 it:	 ‘a	 prerequisite	 for	 universal	 human	





managed	 firms	 operating	 in	 competitive	 markets.	 Markets	 are	 still	 able	 to	
perform	 the	 Hayekian	 functions	 regarding	 discovery,	 knowledge	 production,	
innovation	and	 the	 stimulation	of	entrepreneurship,	 and	even	competition,	but	
worker-managed	 firms	would	eliminate	what	Burczak	sees	as	 the	 fundamental	
basis	of	exploitation	of	capitalism:	the	private	appropriation	of	collective	labour.	
For	 Burczak,	 the	 source	 of	 capitalist	 exploitation	 is	 not	 private	 ownership	 but	
rather	 the	 ‘ability	 of	 the	 owner	 of	 the	means	 of	 production	 to	 appropriate	 the	
entire	 output	 of	 an	 enterprise	 that	 employs	 wage	 labour’	 (ibid.:	 110).	 His	




of	 why	 exploitation	 and	 alienation	 do	 not	 go	 away	 through	 statist	 forms	 of	
socialism	 and	 public	 ownership	 where,	 despite	 the	 replacement	 of	 private	









and	 centralisation	 yet	 are	 revolutionary	 in	 providing	workers	with	 ownership	
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and	decision-making	power	in	the	economy.	Essentially,	his	project	involves	re-
reading	 Hayek	 in	 ‘postmodern’	 terms	 because	 of	 the	 latter’s	 convincing	
arguments	 about	 the	 imperfectibility	 of	 knowledge,	 the	 limits	 to	 scientific	
rationality	and	the	universalism	of	Enlightenment	thought,	which	have	informed	








Burczak	 departs	 from	 Hayek	 is	 around	 questions	 of	 ownership	 (or	 rather	 the	
collectivization	versus	the	individualization	of	ownership),	democracy	and	social	
justice.	Where	Hayek	viewed	private	capitalist	forms	of	ownership	backed	up	by	
legal	 contracts	 as	 sufficient	 to	 promote	 a	 ‘thin’	 version	 of	 the	 common	 good,	
Burczak	 retains	 the	 Marxist	 insight	 about	 the	 uneven	 nature	 of	 power	 under	
capitalist	institutions.		Furthermore,		Burczak’s	emphasis	upon	the	importance	of	
collective	organizational	forms,	as	opposed	to	Hayek’s	selfish	rational	individual,	
to	 overcome	 the	 problems	 of	 labour	 appropriation	 and	 alienation,	 also	 chimes	
with	 Ostrom’s	 work	 in	 highlighting	 the	 possibilities	 offered	 by	 regimes	 of	




Perhaps	 the	most	 innovative	 and	 compelling	 aspect	 of	 Burczak’s	 work	 in	 this	
regard	is	the	way	he	turns	Hayek’s	economic	arguments	back	on	themselves	 in	
political	 terms.	 To	 this	 end,	 he	 uses	 Hayek’s	 well-made	 arguments	 about	 the	
context-laden	 nature	 of	 economic	 life	 to	 expose’s	 Hayek’s	 underplaying	 of	
institutional	 power	 in	 a	 capitalist	 system.	 Hayek’s	 faith	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 legal	
institutions	 under	 capitalism	 to	 arbitrate	 neutrally	 between	 economic	 actors	
(e.g.	worker	and	manager)	 is	naïve	 in	the	extreme,	 forgetting	that	 like	all	other	
institutions	they	are	socially	constructed	and	context	dependent.	In	other	words,	





With	 others	 (notably	 Prychitko	 2002)	 Burczak	 demonstrates	 that	 on	 purely	
scientific,	rather	than	ideological,	grounds,	there	can	be	no	Hayekian	objection	to	
a	worker	managed	economy	‘in	the	context	of	widely	held	private	property	and	
market	 exchange’	 (Burczak	 2006:	 120).	 Worker-managed	 firms	 would	 act	 no	
differently	from	capitalist-managed	ones;	indeed,	they	may	even	perform	better	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 take	 a	 longer-term	 perspective	 and	 their	 greater	
willingness	 to	 use	 their	 tacit	 knowledge	 to	 improve	 the	 productivity	 and	
performance	 of	 the	 firm.	 Indeed	 they	 may	 well	 be	 more	 efficient	 because	





These	 are	 important	 arguments	 and	 help	 to	 dispel	many	 of	 the	 assumed	 (but	
largely	 unsubstantiated)	 efficiencies	 under	 hierarchical	 forms	 of	 capitalist	
management	 in	 mainstream	 debates.	 Clearly,	 there	 is	 considerable	 scope	 for	
cooperative	 and	worker-owned	 forms	 of	 organization	 alongside	 the	 continued	
use	of	markets	in	particular	sectors	of	the	economy,	particularly	those	consumer	
sectors	 (such	as	 clothing	or	 consumer	 electronics)	 that	 require	more	devolved	
decision-	making	 in	 the	context	of	dynamic	and	complex	 forms	of	demand	and	
individual	 preference.	 However,	 the	 primacy	 attached	 by	 Burczak	 to	 market	
forms	 and	 the	 rejection	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 public	 ownership	 beyond	 private	













dispossession’	 in	 a	 more	 recent	 conceptualisation	 (Harvey	 2003;	 De	 Angelis	




profit	 maximization.	 Key	 for	 us	 here	 is	 the	 point	 that	 it	 is	 the	 opening	 up	 of	
hitherto	collectively	organized	non-market	orders	 to	 competition	and	 the	 “free	




all	 market	 forms	 lead	 inevitably	 to	 conditions	 of	 gross	 exploitation	 and	
inequality.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Hodgson	 approvingly	 cites	 Diane	 Elson’s	 plan	 to	
refashion	the	labour	market	along	more	equitable	grounds	that	“the	market	can	
take	 a	wide	 variety	 of	 forms,	 and	 some	 of	 these	 are	much	more	 objectionable	
than	others”	 (1999:	 97).	Moreover,	 as	 the	 varieties	 of	 capitalism	approach	has	
demonstrated	 (e.g.	 Hall	 and	 Soskice	 2001)	 markets	 are	 ultimately	 socially	
constructed	institutions	that	vary	widely	in	time	and	space	and	are	fashioned	out	
of	 existing	 social	 and	 cultural	 norms	 and	 practices,	 rather	 than	 having	 some	
universal	 set	 of	 principles.	 Thus,	 Nordic	 and	 Germanic	 capitalisms	 are	 often	
compared	favourably	to	Anglo-Saxon	ones	because	markets	are	more	embedded	
in	 social	 institutions	 that	 promote	 the	 common	 good	 over	 Hayekian	 negative	
individualistic	 freedoms.	 They	 provide	 graphic	 illustration	 of	 the	 way	 that	
different	 social	 configurations	 can	 produce	 more	 progressive	 institutional	
arrangements	within	capitalism	(Albert	1993,	Amable	2003).	
	
More	 specifically	 though	 here,	 the	 point	 to	 make	 is	 that	 the	 unleashing	 of	 a	
neoliberal	inspired	deregulated	market	regime	globally	in	the	past	three	decades		
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has	 intensified	 the	 level	 of	 appropriation	 of	 common	 and	 public	 resources	 for	
private	 and	 elite	 ends	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	multitude.	 A	 parallel	 argument	 to	
Burczak’s	 position	 on	 private	 property	 relations	might	 be	 to	 say	 that	 there	 is	
nothing	wrong	with	 the	 institution	 of	 the	market	 per	 se	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 some	




Even	accepting	 a	 role	 for	 the	market	 in	 a	 socialist	 economy,	 it	 is	 of	 a	different	
order	 of	 magnitude	 to	 allow	 it	 to	 be	 the	 only	 form	 of	 resource	 allocation.	
Recognising	 Polanyi’s	 warning	 about	 the	 destructive	 powers	 of	 a	 dominant	
market	 order	 over	 society	 means	 that	 we	 need	 to	 be	 mindful	 of	 totalizing	
projects	 that,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 unleash	 a	 narrow	 selfish	 individualism	 as	 the	
dominant	value	in	economic	practice.	It	is	precisely	the	incursion	and	spread	of	
‘free	market	values’	and	norms	–	through	heightened	commodification	processes	
–	 into	 all	 areas	 of	 economic	 life	which	 needs	 to	 be	 resisted	 and	 rolled	 back	 if	
wider	 social	 goals,	 such	 as	 environmental	 sustainability,	 decent	 and	
‘choiceworthy’	 lives	 and	 social	 justice,	 are	 to	 be	 achieved.	 Accepting	 that	 the	




At	 root	 here,	 the	 issue	 is	 the	 dangers	 of	 monotheism	 and	 centralization	 of	
economic	power	and	decision-making,	whether	this	 is	under	both	monopoly	or	
‘late’	 capitalist	 regimes	or	Soviet-style	socialism.	My	argument	here	 is	 that	 this	
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can	be	achieved	without	rejecting	the	continued	role	of	planning	and	other	non-




idea	 of	worker	 ownership	 and	 surplus	 appropriation,	 nor	 is	 it	with	 the	
introduction	of	markets	into	the	idea	of	socialism.	I	find	totally	plaus-	ible	
a	rejection	of	socialism	as	a	centrally	planned	calculation	...	The	problem	
is,	 rather,	 with	 the	 presumption,	 central	 to	 the	 rhetorical	 force	 of	









owned	 firms	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 cooperative	 would	 want	 to	 engage	 with	 and	
encourage	other	moralities	and	value	systems	(e.g.	Gibson-Graham	2006).	How	
much	 of	 a	 revolution	 would	 it	 be	 if	 private	 and	 selfish	 capitalist	 rationalities	
were	to	be	replaced	by	the	same	private	and	selfish	rationalities	of	the	collective	
direct	 producers?	 In	 a	world	 characterized	 by	 a	 growing	 proportion	 of	 people	





Developing	 an	 economy	 that	 is	 genuinely	 open,	 diverse	 and	 libertarian	 (in	 the	





grounds	 that	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 undemocratic;	 regimes	 that	 replace	 private	
ownership	 with	 state	 ownership	 replace	 one	 type	 of	 elite	 appropriating	 the	
product	of	labour	with	another.		
	
Arguing	 in	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Hodgson	 criticizes	 traditional	 left	 thinking	 of	 the	
socialist	 rather	 than	anarchist	variety	–	by	both	revolutionary	communists	and	
the	reformist	wing	of	social	democracy	from	Marx	onwards	–	for	its	insistence	on	
an	 economy	 where	 private	 ownership	 and	 markets	 have	 been	 completely	
abolished	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 form	 of	 common	 ownership	 of	 the	 means	 of	
production.	 For	 Hodgson,	 Marx	 and	 Engels’s	 failure	 to	 take	 markets	 seriously	
was	equated	with	a	monolithic	vision	of	state	ownership:		
...	 in	 their	 sparse	words	on	 the	economic	organization	of	 socialism,	 they	






right	up	until	 the	1950s	when	 the	British	Labour	Party	 and	 the	German	Social	
Democrats,	along	with	some	eastern	European	regimes,	began	to	accept	the	role	
of	markets	alongside	planning.	 In	other	words,	Hodgson	reads	 into	 the	Marxist	
rejection	of	markets	 and	 the	 commitment	 to	 common	or	public	 ownership	 –	 a	
lack	 of	 pluralism,	 diversity	 and	 by	 implication	 democracy	 in	 economic	




In	 this	way,	Hodgson	 seems	 to	 fall	 into	 the	mistake	 of	 equating	 pluralism	 and	
diversity	solely	with	some	form	of	mixed	economy	in	which	market	mechanisms,	




forms	 comes	 from	 John	 O’Neill	 (O’Neill	 1998,	 2003,	 2007).	 Drawing	 upon	 the	
work	of	the	associational	socialist	Otto	Neurath,	who	was	involved	with	socialist	
experiments	 in	decentralized	planning	 in	Munich	and	Vienna	 in	 the	1920s	and	
1930s,	O’Neill	rejects	the	scientific	rationality	of	both	mainstream	economics	and	
orthodox	 Marxism	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 pluralistic	 perspective	 that	 accepts	 the	
limitations	 and	 provisional	 nature	 of	 knowledge	 claims.	 This	 is	 important	
because	 it	 rejects	 both	 market	 and	 socialist	 solutions	 to	 economic	 problems	
which	 seek	 to	 universalize	 decision-making	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 making	 so-called	
rational	 choices:	 “The	 unpredictability	 in	 science	 in	 general	 entails	 that	 the	
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technocratic	 ideal	 of	 the	 discovery	of	 an	optimal	 solution	 to	 social	 decisions	 is	
untenable”	(O’Neill	2003:	191).	
	
Despite	 agreeing	 with	 Hodgson	 and	 Hayek	 about	 the	 imperfectability	 of	
knowledge	 and	 the	 role	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 economic	 life,	 O’Neill	 draws	 very	
different	conclusions,	suggesting	that	markets	are	the	not	the	only	organizational	
form	that	can	handle	 the	complexities	of	 local	and	distributed	 tacit	knowledge.	
He	uses	the	scientific	and	academic	communities	as	exemplars	par	excellence	of	
decentralized	 non-market	 orders	 that	 very	 effectively	 allow	 the	 development	
and	 exchange	 of	 knowledge	 in	 what	 we	 might	 term	 a	 global	 commons.	 The	
internet	too,	through	innovations	like	Wikipedia	(Wright	2010),	 is	very	good	at	
creating	 non-market,	 non-hierarchical	 knowledge	 exchange.	 O’Neill	 points	 out	
that	it	exactly	the	threat	of	growing	marketization	and	commercialization	of	that	
is	 likely	 to	 reduce	 processes	 of	 innovation	 and	 discovery	 exchange	 in	 these	
spheres.	 “The	 danger	 in	 the	 current	 introduction	 of	 market	 mechanisms	 into	
public	 science	 is	 that	 it	 will	 slow	 rather	 than	 increase	 the	 rate	 of	 innovation.	
Conflicts	around	the	development	of	new	intellectual	property	regimes	center	on	






the	 problems	 inherent	 in	 imposing	 universal	 systems	 of	 value.	 He	 condemned	
attempts	 to	 impose	 a	 universal	 theoretical	 solution	 to	 social	 or	 intellectual	
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problems	 through	rational	enquiry	as	 ‘pseudo-rationalist’.	Solutions	are	always	
provisional.	Thus,	 to	offer	up	 the	market	as	means	of	 resolving	knowledge	 is	a	
mistake,	as	he	pointed	out	in	an	exchange	with	Hayek	in	the	1940s.		The	problem	
of	 low	 predictability	 and	 imperfect	 knowledge	 faces	 all	 human	 actors	 tasked	
with	making	 decisions	 so	 that	 Hayek’s	 advocacy	 of	 the	market	 resulted	 in	 the	
same	flawed	logic	that	in	his	eyes	afflicts	socialist	planners.	Neurath	neatly	turns	
the	 tables	 on	Hayek	 by	 invoking	 the	 “intolerance	 of	 the	market	 economy’	 and	
stressing	 that	 “it	 is	 possible	 for	 forms	 of	 economy	 of	 various	 kinds	 to	 exist	





collective	 but	 also	 diverse	 decision-making	 processes	 as	 a	 general	 philosophy.	
Contra	Burczak,	Hodgson	 and	others,	 diverse	 forms	of	 public	 ownership	 -	 that	
allow	different	groups	of	citizens	to	have	some	level	of	participation	and	stake	in	
the	 economy,	 compared	 to	 the	 situation	 at	 present,	 where	 a	 small	 minority	










him	 a	 broader	 and	more	 diverse	 canvas	 to	 articulate	 his	 own	 perspectives	 on	
public	ownership.	His	 recognition	and	 respect	of	older	 traditions	of	mutualism	
and	cooperation	was	in	stark	contrast,	of	course,	to	many	of	his	contemporaries,	
who	 regarded	 older	 forms	 of	 social	 relations	 as	 inevitably	 conservative	 and	
antiquated.	While	Neurath	still	held	to	the	vision	of	an	overall	grand	plan	in	the	
1920s,	he	did	advocate	a	tolerance	of	older	forms	of	collectivism	that	could	be	an	
important	 element	 in	 strengthening	 broader	 social	 support	 for	 public	
ownership:		
Today’s	 socialism	 has	 many	 intolerant	 traits	 ...	 Why	 could	 the	 peaceful	
movements	for	community-oriented	economy	not	be	united?	Community	
economy,	guild	economy,	social	economy	characterise	certain	periods,	but	
they	 also	 exist	 side	 by	 side	 and	 give	 satisfaction	 to	 different	 types	 of	
human	being	(Neurath	2002	[1920]:	402).	
Ultimately,	public	ownership	needs	to	be	forged	in	a	manner	that	respects	such	
differences	 in	 economic	 identity	 and	 practice	 (Gibson-Graham	 2006).	 What	










continue	 to	 require	 planning	 and	 strategic	 decision-making	 at	 higher	 scales,	
these	do	not	have	to	be	concentrated	within	institutions,	people	or	places.	Within	
any	 territorial	 form	 of	 political	 governance,	 the	 key	 decision-making	 functions	
for	 different	 economic	 activities	 can	 and	 should	 be	 dispersed.	We	might	 here	
contrast	 the	 decentralized	 and	 federalized	 polity	 of	 post-1945	 Germany	
favourably	with	 the	 growing	 concentration	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 in	
the	 UK	 (despite	 recent	 devolution)	 around	 London	 and	 the	 south-east	 of	
England.	 The	 right	 institutional	 arrangements	 can	 decentre	 knowledge,	 power	
and	decision	making	within	any	broader	polity.	
	
An	 economy	 organized	 around	 public	 ownership	 should	 therefore	 be	 one	 that	
also	disperses	administrative	units,	knowledge	production	and	competence	and	
has	 a	 plurality	 and	 diversity	 of	 organizations	 (e.g.	 mutual	 bodies,	 trade	 union	
research	networks,	small	business	associations,	government	and	autonomously	






The	 implications	of	 this	 are	 critical,	 for	 it	 implies	 that	 there	 should	not	be	any	
one	 dominant	model	 of	 ownership	 or	 governance.	While	we	might	 agree	 on	 a	
common	 or	 shared	 set	 of	 rules	 and	 principles	 for	 public	 ownership,	 such	 as	 a	
commitment	 to	 production	 for	 social	 needs	 rather	 than	 exchange	 values,	 the	
pursuit	of	social	equality,	economic	democracy	and	environmental	sustainability,	
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the	 principle	 of	 organizational	 diversity	 should	 also	 be	 enshrined	 in	 a	 new	
approach	to	public	ownership	(Cumbers	and	McMaster	2012).	Diverse	forms	of	
collective	 social	 relations	 would	 act	 as	 a	 further	 brake	 in	 preventing	 the	
emergence	of	totalitarian	power	structures.		
	
Open	 dialogue	 and	 democracy	 in	 this	 sense	 require	 a	 degree	 of	 diversity	 and	
variation	in	economic	practice.	This	commitment	to	diversity	implies	that	there	
is	no	one	definitive	form	of	public	ownership	but	a	range	of	collective	forms	can	
and	 should	 coexist.	 Neurath	 clearly	 shares	 some	 libertarian	 concerns	 with	 an	
overweening	and	centralizing	state	insofar	as	he	is	distrustful	of	the	militarism	of	
nation-states	and	prefers	self-governing	associations	(O’Neill	2003).	This	did	not	
mean	 that	 there	 could	 not	 be	 an	 overall	 coordinating	 body	 charged	 with	 a	
‘general	plan’:	in	effect	this	is	what	elected	governments	do	at	present.	
	
But,	 underneath	 this,	 and	 enacted	 in	 his	 proposals	 for	 the	 socialization	 of	 the	
Bavarian	 economy	 following	 the	 brief	 post-1918	 revolutionary	 period,	 was	 a	
commitment	to	organizational	diversity:	
The	 programme	 of	 socialization	 here	 discussed	 makes	 an	 attempt	 at	 a	
simultaneous	 realization	 of	 socialism,	 solidarism	 and	 communism	 ...	 It	
provides	 for	 cooperatives	 for	 peasants	 and	 craftsmen,	 for	 collectivist	





Of	 course,	 organizational	 diversity	 was	 also	 recognized	 by	 Lenin,	 in	 his	
transitional	 economic	 strategy	 in	 the	 1920s,	 which	 clearly	 did	 not	 ultimately	
produce	decentralization	of	power,	economic	democracy	or	pluralism.	But,	there	
is	 a	 deeper	 point	 here	 captured	 by	 Neurath	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 diverse	
ownership	 forms	 in	 an	 economy	 more	 generally	 to	 decisively	 shift	 people’s	
identities	 and	 allegiances	 away	 from	 what	 he	 saw	 as	 the	 ‘intolerance’	 of	 the	
market	economy	or	nationalisms	towards	a	set	of	more	dispersed	identities	and	
loyalties.	 A	 good	 contemporary	 example	 would	 be	 the	 Danish	 energy	 sector	
where	 there	are	a	plethora	of	 forms	of	public	ownership	 from	state	ownership	
(the	 national	 oil	 company,	 DONG),	 producer	 cooperatives	 (wind	 turbines),	
consumer	cooperatives	and	municipally	owned	entities	 (electricity	distribution	
companies).	 This	 diverse,	 non-market	 based	 and	 collectively	 owned	
organizational	 assemblage	 has	 produced	 one	 of	 the	 most	 impressive	
performances	 anywhere	 in	 the	 world	 in	 shifting	 towards	 renewable	 energy	
(Cumbers	 2012).	 Neurath’s	 broader	 point	 is	 that	 a	 system	 of	 associational	
planning	whereby	people	would	be	members	of	many	different	 associations	at	
overlapping	 scales	 and	 spheres	 of	 life	 would	 advance	 genuine	 solidarity	 and	




While	 there	 are	 clearly	 some	 problems	 with	 Neurath’s	 account,	 there	 are	
important	 insights	 here	 that	 help	 to	 take	 the	 debate	 beyond	 the	 standard	
critiques	 of	 socialist	 planning	 and	 public	 ownership.	 The	 Hodgson	 critique	 of	
democratic	planning	 is	not	entirely	overcome	here,	given	globalization	and	 the	
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increasingly	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 capitalist	 economy.	 Nevertheless,	 one	 does	
not	have	to	sign	up	to	Neurath’s	vision	of	a	market-free	decentralized	socialism	
to	recognize	the	importance	of	his	arguments	in	overcoming	the	totalitarianisms	
of	 free	 market	 thinking	 or	 centralizing	 state	 projects.	 Reclaiming	 the	 diverse	








the	 protector	 of	 democracy	 and	 individual	 liberty.	 Hayek’s	 intellectual	
arguments	in	particular	have	been	compelling	in	seeking	to	get	to	grips	with	the	
flaws	 apparent	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 issues	 of	 uncertainty,	 pluralism	 and	
democracy.	 Many	 have	 taken	 up	 this	 task	 with	 gusto,	 none	 more	 so	 that	
Theodore	 Burczak	 in	 his	 recent	 attempt	 to	 reformulate	 a	 market	 version	 of	
socialism	(Burczak	2006).	While	accepting	Hayek’s	critique	of	socialism	planning	
for	 its	 omissions	 in	 dealing	 with	 knowledge	 problems;	 central	 issues	 for	 any	
economic	 system;	 Burczak’s	 ingenious	 appeal	 to	 competitive	 markets	 under	
collective	 ownership	 is	 an	 important	 riposte.	 Burzcak’s insightful thesis around 
worker ownership and the important issue of ‘appropriative justice’ is an important 




in	 considering	 the	 economic	 institutions	 that	 can	 bring	 together	 technical	
proficiency	and	social	 justice.	Two	points	are	critical	here	 in	 the	argument	 laid	
out	 above.	 First,	 is	 that	 the	 continued	 emphasis	 upon	 the	market	 as	 a	 form	 to	
promote	innovation,	diversity	and	economic	tolerance	has	its	own	problems	and	
indeed	is	no	more	likely	to	resolve	some	of	the	issues	apparent	under	forms	of	
state	 and	 public	 ownership.	 While,	 following	 the	 above	 discussion,	 there	 is	
clearly	 a	 role	 for	 markets	 in	 some	 fashion	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 a	 socialist	
economy,	it	is	quite	a	big	leap	to	dismiss	alternative	non-market	institutions	and	
mechanisms	for	co-ordinating	the	economy	out	of	hand,	or	to	put	quite	so	much	
emphasis	 upon	 market	 forms.	 The	 reframing	 of	 an	 economic	 agenda	 around	
socialism	 and	 economic	 democracy	 also	 has	 to	 go	 beyond	 market	 values	 to	
incorporate	non-market	 forms	and	ethics.	Not	only	are	 the	market’s	powers	 to	
stimulate	 knowledge	 and	 diversity	 exaggerated	 but	 the	 competitive	 and	 profit	
driven	 ethos	 is	 not	 and	 should	not	 be	 the	 only	 ‘economic	 identity’	 that	 shapes	
economic	 decision-making	 (Gibson-Graham	 2006).	 Accepting	 the	 economy	 as	
ultimately	a	socially	and	politically	embedded	phenomenon,	the	task	is	therefore	
to	create	institutions	that	both	protect	and	encourage	non-invidious,	market	and	
non-market	 forms.	At	 the	 core	 of	 these	 arguments	 is	 the	need	 for	 institutional	
rules	and	organizational	 forms	 that	are	 fundamentally	grounded	 in	democratic	









ideas	 about	 public	 ownership	 we	 do	 not	 fall	 back	 into	 the	 mistake	 of	 the	 all	
encompassing	 model	 and	 vision.	 Public	 ownership	 needs	 to	 take	 on	 more	
variegated	 forms	 that	 are	 both	 respective	 of	 geographical	 variations	 in	 pre—
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Notes	
	
1	Prior	to	becoming	Prime	Minister,	at	a	meeting	of	the	Institute	of	Economic	
Affairs,	Margaret	Thatcher	famously	quipped,	“This	is	what	we	believe”,	
brandishing	in	her	hand	as	she	spoke	a	copy	of	Hayek’s	Constitution	of	Liberty	
(Lister	2011,	1).	
	
2	Here	I	will	henceforth	use	the	term	public	ownership	but	I	define	the	term	
broadly	in	terms	of	all	those	attempts	both	outside	and	through	the	state	to	
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create	forms	of	collective	ownership	in	opposition	to	private	ownership	(e.g.	
including	employee-owned	firms,	producer	and	consumer	cooperatives)	as	well	
as	those	that	involving	state	ownership.	See	Cumbers	2012	for	an	extended	
discussion	of	these	definitional	issues.	
	
3	See	Cumbers	2012,	chapter	1	for	an	overview.	
4	Although	in	my	view,	Burczak’s	approach	remains	preferable	methodologically	
because	of	it	is	rooted	within	a	political	economy	framework	that	recognizes	the	
ontological	primacy	of	social	relations	over	Ostrom’s	rational	choice	and	
methodological	individualism	(see	Fine	2010).	
